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The question to what extent governance structure affects people’s well-being, here reflected in the 
decision  to commit  suicide,  remains  still  largely  unknown.  This  paper  examines the effects  of 
political institutions and governance structure on suicide using a balanced panel for 26 Swiss states 
(cantons) over the period 1980–1998. Our results indicate that stronger popular rights and more 
fiscal decentralization reduce suicide, while more local autonomy increases it. The effects are not 
strongly gender-specific. However, we find evidence that the effect of direct legislation is partly 
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1 Introduction 
The question of what determines people’s happiness has recently gained new attention. Present 
research focuses on either aggregate economic determinants or soft factors of life satisfaction based 
on social  interactions. The  most  recent  contributions emphasize the importance  of trust among 
citizens in society and social networks, on the one hand, and government quality, political stability, 
or  economic  reform  on  the  other  (Frey  and  Stutzer,  2000;  Brainerd,  2001;  Bjørnskov,  2003; 
Helliwell,  2007).  Since  this  branch  of  research  is  still  in  its  infancy,  many  questions  remain 
unanswered.  In  particular,  recent  analyses  of  the  effects  of  governance  structure  and  political 
institutions on people’s well-being provide an ambiguous and incomplete picture. 
More specifically, previous happiness research has been inconclusive on the contribution of 
stronger participatory rights, political autonomy, and fiscal decentralization – institutions that are 
hypothesized to lead to policy outcomes closer to local voter preferences. Frey and Stutzer (2000) 
show  a  positive  impact  of  direct  democracy  on  individual  life  satisfaction  in  Switzerland.  In 
contrast, Dorn et al. (2008), using more recent data from the Swiss Household Panel Survey (SHP), 
find no significant influence. Similarly, even in an international context, the effect of democratic 
rights on people’s happiness remains ambiguous (Schyns, 2002; Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 
2008c; Dorn et al., 2007), most likely only being influential in rich countries (Bjørnskov, Dreher 
and Fischer, 2007a, 2008a). As to decentralization, we are only aware of one study by Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer (2008b) that tests this factor in a model of life satisfaction, for an international 
cross-section of more than 60 countries, and identifies fiscal decentralization as conducive to well-
being. 
Suicidal behavior is often viewed as the flip side of the happiness coin. In a cross-national 
analysis, Helliwell (2007) shows that the main aggregate determinants of both suicide and self-
reported life satisfaction qualitatively exert the same impact. In economics, empirical literature on 
suicide has relied on Hamermesh and Soss’s (1974) theoretical model. In this model, an individual 
takes her own life when the discounted expected lifetime utility remaining to her falls below some   3   
threshold level.
 The model then predicts that suicide decreases with those political institutions and 
governance structures mentioned above that make people better off. Assuming that the principle of 
rationality also governs at–first–sight–‘irrational’ choices which affect experienced utility, suicide 
research is part of happiness research. While surveys on life satisfactions are more likely to address 
the entire happiness distribution, self-killings are observed most likely for those at the bottom of the 
personal well-being scale.  Assuming rationality, suicide data  provide an alternative measure of 
happiness (or unhappiness) with several advantages over experiments and surveys of happiness.
1 
First,  as  Helliwell  (2007)  correctly  emphasizes,  suicide  as  an  “ultimate  assessment  of  life 
satisfaction” (p. 455) presumably constitutes a more objective, and thus more reliable, indicator of 
well-being than any survey data on self-assessed happiness. Second, in contrast to life satisfaction, 
suicide  rates  are  relatively  comparably  measured  across  countries  and  cultures.  Third,  we  also 
accept Helliwell’s (2007) argument that using suicide data mitigates the problem of the potential 
reverse causation encountered in life satisfaction studies.
2  
As  regards  the  influence  of  institutions,  the  status  quo  of  the  suicide  research  is  exactly 
analogous to that described above for happiness research. Thus, the issue to what extent political 
institutions  and  governance  structures  explain  variations  in  societal  suicide  rates  remains 
unanswered.  In  this  paper,  we  aim  at  filling  this  gap  by  analyzing  the  impact  of  political 
institutions—particularly local autonomy, fiscal decentralization, and popular rights—on societal 
suicide rates using a panel data approach for 26 Swiss states (cantons) over the period 1980–1998. 
Furthermore, as in the U.S., Switzerland’s three-tier federal structure, which grants Swiss states 
great fiscal and political independence from the federal level, results in a variation in political 
institutions at the state level that we exploit in this analysis. We employ a panel data approach that 
constitutes a considerable improvement on much previous work in this area that relies on time-
series or cross-sectional data only. Finally, in addition to modeling the total suicide rate, we also 
estimate separate models for men and women, as the underlying determinants of suicide could 
differ between the sexes (e.g., Qin et al., 2000; Helliwell, 2007; Minoiu and Rodríguez, 2008).   4   
Understanding  gender  differences  might  be  important  to  informing  appropriate  (health)  policy 
formulations. 
Our results show that stronger participatory rights in Swiss cantons reduce overall suicide, for 
both men and women. This result corresponds loosely to the suicide-lowering impact of economic 
and political freedoms obtained by Jungeilges and Kirchgässner (2002). However, in contrast to 
corresponding findings in the happiness research (Frey and Stutzer, 2000), more local political 
autonomy appears detrimental to well-being. Both men and women benefit from more decentralized 
government spending. However, there is a slight differential impact of these institutions by gender 
suggesting that the female population gains more than the male. This result is loosely in line with 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007b), who showed that giving more political rights to women is 
beneficial to both men and women, with a stronger effect for females than for males. Finally, a 
transmission  channel  analysis  with  sub-federal  government  spending  data  suggests  that  the 
beneficial  effects  of  stronger  participatory  rights  go  beyond  that  of  increased  efficiency  and 
effectiveness in the health sector.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the hypotheses 
on the potential effects of institutions on suicide rates. Subsequently, we summarize the existing 
empirical evidence, after which we describe our empirical model and methodological approach. The 
fifth section presents our empirical findings, and the final section concludes the paper.  
 
 
2 Institutional determinants of suicide 
Musgrave  (1959)  suggests  that  governments  should  have  three  main  objectives:  income 
redistribution, macroeconomic stability, and, most important, efficient provision of public goods. 
Thus,  the  institutional  structure  of  a  state  might  well  have  an  impact  on  the  extent  to  which 
governments  can  realize  these  goals  and  improve  citizen  well-being,  mirrored  by  the  non-
occurrence  of  suicidal  behavior.  As  regards  the  public  goods  aspect,  according  to  classical 
economic theory, political institutions may increase the efficiency and efficacy in the provision of   5   
public health care, lowering suicide rates. This view does not assume rationality of the suicidal 
person, rather focusing on the supply of the public good ‘health care’ only.  
A different strand of political economy literature relates governance structure to the occurrence 
of suicide through the median voter hypothesis, focusing on the allocation of goods and resources 
and their distance from the median voter’s preferred policy. The hypothesized relationships in this 
paper are based on the latter argument. 
In the case  of the federal  country Switzerland, institutions at  the state level  that affect the 
allocation  of  goods  and  resources  by  governments  include  institutions  of  direct  legislation, 
decentralization between the state-tier and local tiers, and the degree of autonomy at the local level. 
In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  exploit  the  variation  in  these  institutions  across  26  Swiss  states 
(cantons).  
Institutions of direct democracy are defined as the exertion of direct influence by the citizenry 
on the political decision-making process through the use of popular initiatives and referenda, both 
of which serve as a corrective device for government policies. According to the political scientist 
Keman (2000), federalism is defined as the overlapping of spending authority (‘the right to act’) 
with that of political decision-making competency (‘the right to decide’).
3 However, in this paper, 
we explicitly treat the concept of fiscal decentralization and that of local political autonomy as 
separate dimensions. On the one hand, we look at fiscal decentralization—commonly defined as the 
local authority to make implementation decisions about and through government spending (‘the 
right to act’).
4 On the other hand, we view political decentralization, which we prefer to term ‘local 
autonomy’, as present when each government level has its own well-defined sphere of political 
authority and can exert ‘the right to decide’ without fear of being overruled by a higher government 
body (Riker, 1964)
5. 
Turning to the hypothesized well-being effect of fiscal decentralization, according to public 
choice  theory,  we  expect  fiscal  decentralization  to  improve  the  (allocation  and  production) 
efficiency  of  government  and  thus  to  promote  economic  development  (Oates,  1993).
6  More 
specifically,  in  the  case  of  public-spirited  governors,  efficiency  may  be  achieved  by  locally   6   
differentiated outputs addressing differences in local median voters’ tastes (Hayek, 1939; Oates, 
1972; Bardhan, 1997). Potentially, this process is enhanced by ‘yardstick competition’ that works 
even in the presence of a revenue-seeking, surplus-maximizing Leviathan (Tiebout, 1956; Salmon, 
1987). As a result, growth of the public sector and citizens’ fiscal exploitation may be restrained 
while economic growth through innovation is promoted (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Gramlich, 
1987). Thus, we hypothesize that fiscal decentralization should increase citizens’ well-being: 
Hypothesis 1: Fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with suicide rates.  
However,  there  are  arguments  that  support  the  opposite  prediction.  More  specifically, 
decentralization  might  equally  cause  an  underprovision  of  public  goods  and  efficiency  losses 
because of coordination problems between local jurisdictions, or tax rates falling below the optimal 
level (the ‘race to the bottom’) (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Tanzi, 1996). A more decentralized 
governance  structure  may  impede  redistributive  policies  between  jurisdictions  and  individuals, 
which aim at mitigating the effects of an unequal resource endowment (Prud’homme, 1995). In 
addition, local governments may not internalize macroeconomic instability spillovers, facilitating 
an excess accumulation of local debts. Finally, federal governance structures might promote rent-
seeking and corruption opportunities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). These considerations lead to the 
contrasting hypothesis:
7 
Hypothesis 2: Fiscal decentralization is positively associated with suicide rates. 
Arguments supporting an impact of local (political) autonomy that increases well-being are similar 
to those in favor of fiscal decentralization. Again, decentralized political decision-making is said to 
lead  to  a  provision  of  public  goods  closer  to  voter  preferences  by  regional  governments  that 
compete for mobile capital and labor (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Qian and Roland, 1998). The 
neo-institutionalists  add  the  view  that  local  autonomy  might  preserve  and  promote  market 
functioning (Weingast, 1995). Others stress that it potentially acts as a safeguard to protect the   7   
democratic rights of citizens in general and minorities in particular (‘voice’ and ‘exit’) (Hirschman, 
1970; Riker, 1975; Elazar, 1995). We therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Local autonomy is negatively associated with suicide rates. 
There are, however, potential drawbacks to local autonomy, again quite analogous to the above 
mentioned  negative  aspects  of  fiscal  decentralization.  Additional  considerations  are  an  unclear 
distinction  of  competences  between  government  tiers,  reducing  political  accountability  and 
providing  loopholes  for  Leviathan  politicians  and  bureaucrats  (Treisman,  2000b).  In  addition, 
overlapping and competing regulations in different tiers (horizontal competition) may potentially be 
detrimental to governance, particularly affecting law enforcement and legality (Treisman, 2000b). 
Thus, we formulate a fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Local autonomy is positively associated with suicide rates. 
Finally, we turn to the hypothesized well-being effects of direct democracy. According to public 
choice theory, in a representative political system, the policy chosen by politicians might deviate 
strongly from that preferred by the median voter because of (a) asymmetric information and (b) the 
rent-seeking behavior of politicians. Nevertheless, it is argued that institutions of direct legislation 
may mitigate both causes (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001; Kessler, 2005) not only because they serve 
as an additional information device for decision-makers, but equally because they exert institutional 
veto power that prevents excessive budget growth beyond the optimum, log-rolling activities and 
pork-barrel politics (e.g., Besley and Coate, 2001). Moreover, the provision of public goods is said 
to be more allocative and producer efficient in direct democracies compared to representative ones 
(Pommerehne, 1983), resulting in lower tax levels and higher economic growth, which ultimately 
increase people’s happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2000).
8 Therefore, we assume the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Suicide rates are lower in more direct democratic cantons.   8   
3 Empirical evidence 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  suicide  literature  on  the  effects  of  political  institutions  and 
governance structure is scant. We are aware of only two studies that come close to such an analysis. 
Jungeilges and Kirchgässner (2002) use cross-sectional 1975 data for a sample of 30 countries to 
estimate the effects of socio-economic factors and civil liberties on male and female suicide rates 
across different age groups. They identify a suicide-lowering effect of civil liberties and economic 
freedom. More recently Helliwell (2007), using a panel data set, reports a qualitatively identical 
influence of governance quality as measured by the well-known Kaufman indices. However, to our 
knowledge, there is no empirical analysis of the impact of either narrowly defined democratic rights 
or political and fiscal autonomy on suicide rates. 
The research field closest to the suicide literature is that of happiness because the occurrence of 
suicide may overlap with the bottom tail of the life satisfaction distribution. However, as already 
argued in the introduction, unfortunately, analyses focusing on political institutions and governance 
structure are equally scant. Mixed findings are present for direct democracy in Swiss cantons as 
well as for democracy in an international context (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Dorn et al., 2007, 2008; 
Schyns, 2002; Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007a, 2008). Helliwell (2003, 2007) identifies a life 
satisfaction-increasing impact of the quality of governance, government efficiency, and government 
accountability. Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008b) conclude that fiscal decentralization raises 
well-being independently of the effect of democratic governance structures, while local (political) 
autonomy  appears  indirectly  beneficial  through  its  mitigation  of  (otherwise)  detrimental 
government spending.
9 
Another related branch of literature focuses on the determinants of population health. Some 
empirical work has been carried out on the relationship between political institutions and mortality, 
particularly infant mortality. In general, such research assumes that democracies and decentralized 
governments  improve  public  health  by  allowing  for  more  social  capital,  better  access  to 
information,  greater  opportunities  for  empowerment,  and  better  recognition  of  people’s  needs   9   
(Franco et al., 2005). For (direct) democracy, a few studies have found empirical support for this 
hypothesis  in  both  an  international  context  and  for  Swiss  cantons  (Lena  and  London,  1993; 
Przeworski et al., 2000; Zweifel and Navia, 2000; Barankay, 2001). As regards fiscal and political 
decentralization, a population health-raising impact was reported by Khaleghian (2003). In contrast 
to our approach, however, most of these studies focus exclusively on efficiency aspects of the 
provision of public health care, while we also develop hypotheses in a broader political economy 




4 Model, data and variables 
4.1 Model and method 
In this paper, we estimate a panel data regression model for 26 Swiss states (cantons) for the period 
1980 to 1998. Using the subscripts i and t to refer to the canton and year respectively, we assume 
the following reduced form: 
it it it it v Z X y + + + =       ' '            (1) 
where yit denotes the natural log of the suicide rate in the corresponding sub-population,  is a 
constant term, Xit is a matrix of controls, Zit contains the variables of interest, and vit is the usual 
error term. All variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous; that is, shocks today to (aggregate) 
suicide are assumed not to affect the future values of the regressors. The matrix of controls, Xit, 
includes socio-economic, political, and cultural determinants of suicide. The matrix Zit contains our 
variables of interest, namely measures of direct democracy, fiscal federalism, and local autonomy.  
and  are the corresponding coefficient vectors to be estimated. Observations are weighted by the 
square root of the cantonal population to mitigate potential heteroscedasticity problems (Ruhm, 
2000; Neumayer, 2004). To adjust the results for age, Xit also includes age category variables; 
specifically, the shares of the state population aged between 25 and 44, between 45 and 64, and 65   10   
years  or  older.  Since  a  number  of  studies  at  micro  and  macro  level  provide  evidence  on  the 
differential effect of socio-economic variables by gender, we estimate the model separately for men 
and women (e.g., Andrés, 2005; Chuang and Huang, 2007; Minoiu and Rodríguez, 2008). 
Commonly,  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  suicide  either  fixed  or  random  effect  estimation 
techniques have been used (Chuang and Huang, 1997; Neumayer, 2003; Andrés, 2005). The first 
has  the  advantage  that  the  estimation  is  unbiased,  even  when  the  explanatory  variables  are 
correlated with the unobserved state-specific effects. Unfortunately, for this analysis, because of the 
de facto time invariance of direct democracy and local autonomy, a fixed effects approach that 
requires within variation is not appropriate. A drawback of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
is that the model specification must be as complete as possible to prevent an omitted variable bias. 
We  apply  OLS  with  panel  corrected  standard  errors,  which  are  consistent  in  the  presence  of 
heteroscedasticity  and  serial  autocorrelation.  This  approach  follows  the  majority  of  empirical 
analyses  for  government  spending  in  Swiss  cantons,  which  face  the  identical  methodological 
problems of time-invariant institutional determinants (e.g. Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner, 2008; 
Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001).
10  
 
4.2 Data and variables 
Switzerland: General remarks 
Switzerland is a three-tier federal country (local, state and federal tier) with institutions of political 
decision-making and governance existing at all three levels equally. In contrast to other federal 
countries, Swiss states (cantons) enjoy a degree of political autonomy that is comparable to that of 
US states, covering areas such as policing, education, culture, health care, social welfare, schooling 
and infrastructure, which they finance with their own income and profit taxes whose rates they 
independently set (Feld, 2000; Germann, 2002). In this paper, we exploit institutional variation 
across Swiss cantons, holding the institutional framework at the federal level ‘constant’. At the 
cantonal  level,  we  measure  the  extent  of  direct  democracy  that  allows  the  state  citizenry  to   11   
influence policies of the state governments and parliaments. In this context, fiscal decentralization 
equally applies to the within-canton governance structure that determines the (spending) relation 
between  the  communal  and  the  state  administration  for  each  canton.  Variation  in  governance 
structure, however, also occurs at the communal level, giving rise to local heterogeneity in political 
institutions within Swiss states. In this study, however, we account for this feature indirectly by 
aggregating local characteristics to the state level.  
 
Dependent variable 
Suicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants are computed by the ratio of the number of completed suicides 
to the respective cantonal population for the total, male, and female subpopulations for the period 
1980–1998.  Raw  number  of  suicides  and  population  sizes  were  taken  from  the  Swiss  Federal 
Statistical Office data (hereafter, BFS). We apply a natural log-transformation to the dependent 
variable, with the value of 0.01 replacing zeros prior to the transformation.
11 As Table 1 illustrates, 
for the whole country, the average overall, male, and female suicide rates are 21.99, 32.17, and 
12.12, respectively. Clearly, as is the case elsewhere, men tend to have higher suicide rates than 
women. Table 1 also displays the cantonal means over the observational period, suggesting that 
suicide rates vary substantially across Swiss cantons (minimum: 16.95; maximum: 33.81). 
 
Focal independent variables 
Following the public finance literature (e.g., Akai and Sakata, 2002), this study measures fiscal 
decentralization as the expenditure share of local levels in combined local and cantonal spending, 
obtained  from  the  BFS.
12  Across  Swiss  states,  the  average  local  spending  share  varies  from 1 
percent in Basel-City to 46 percent in Zurich (see Table 1).  
Direct democracy at the state level is measured as a composite index on a continuous 6-point 
scale,  which  is  constructed  as  an  unweighted  average  of  single  assessments  of  the  following 
institutions: the constitutional initiative, the statutory initiative, the statutory referendum, and the   12   
fiscal referendum (Stutzer, 1999). Smaller values indicate that it is more difficult for individual 
citizens  to  make  use  of  their  popular  rights.  Using  a  composite  index  has  the  advantage  that 
interplays among the various institutions are implicitly taken into account. As shown in Tables 1 
and 2, the average level of direct democracy is about 4.3, with Geneva being the least (1.63) and 
Obwalden the most direct democratic (5.65) cantons.   
The indicator of local autonomy is based on a 1992 survey of 1856 Swiss communes in which 
chief local administrators assessed their perceived degree of local autonomy on a 10-point scale, 
ranging from 1, no autonomy at all, to 10, very high (Ladner, 1994). The average values for the 26 
cantons are taken from Frey and Stutzer (2000) and reprinted in Table 1. The lowest average level 
of communal autonomy is found in Geneva (3.2), while the highest is reported for Schaffhausen 
(6.1), followed closely by Obwalden and Zug (both 6.0). 
 
  Other independent controlling variables 
Based on previous findings in empirical suicide research, we select a set of socio-economic and 
demographic control variables usually thought to influence suicide rates and that may be correlated 
with any of our three institutions of interest (for a review, see Lester and Yang, 1997). Some of 
these employed political, social capital, and cultural variables reflect the specific Swiss context of 
our study.  
As  surveyed  by  Marcotte  (2003),  all  empirical  work  on  suicide  follows  the  sociological 
framework developed by Durkheim (1951) and the economic theory of suicide by Hamermesh and 
Soss (1974), which assumes an individual cost-benefit analysis. The economic theory of suicide 
predicts that improved economic conditions  affect  personal income, lowering  the propensity  to 
commit  suicide  (Durkheim,  1951;  Hamermesh  and  Soss,  1974).
13  We  can  expect  a  substantial 
correlation  between  our  institutional  variables  of  interest  and  these  economic  determinants  of 
suicide as empirical research on Switzerland suggests an enhancing influence of direct democracy 
and decentralization on economic performance (e.g. Feld and Savioz, 1997; Matsusaka, 2000). The   13   
economic  environment  is  approximated  by  per  capita  income  level,  unemployment  rates,  and 
growth  in  national  income,  and,  in  a  model  extension,  sub-federal  government  spending,  all 
measures obtained from the BFS. As regards income, several aggregate panel data analyses support 
a suicide lowering hypothesis (Chuang and Huang, 1997, 2007; Brainerd, 2001; Neumayer, 2003a, 
2003b), while for unemployment panel data studies have yielded ambiguous results (Chuang and 
Huang, 1997, 2007; Brainerd, 2001; Neumayer, 2004, 2003a).  
Durkheim (1951) claims that enhanced social integration decreases the likelihood of suicide. 
Traditionally, cities are viewed as more anonymous with looser social networks compared to the 
countryside  (e.g.  Qin  et  al.  2003).  Foreigners  might  be  less  integrated  in  their  host  societies 
(Helliwell, 2004). On the other hand, stronger citizen empowerment may trigger a worse integration 
of foreigners, leading to higher suicide rates, as cantons with stronger political rights may develop a 
self-image shaped by ‘Swiss’ homogeneity, and, thus, are likely to be ethnically more cohesive (and 
more xenophobic).
14. However, for Denmark, Qin et al. (2003) report that male foreigners had a 
smaller risk of suicide compared to their Danish peers. To capture these two socio-demographic 
factors, we include the share of persons living in urbanized areas and that of foreigners in the 
cantonal population, both extracted from the BFS data.  
Putnam (2000, 2001) suggests that social capital is an important determinant of subjective well-
being. Social capital may significantly decrease suicide probability both in its form of generalized 
trust in society as well as in its form of vertical trust, such as confidence in a nation’s law-making 
organs (Helliwell, 2003, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2003).
15 A correlation with our variable of interest may 
be caused by stronger popular rights generating higher levels of generalized or vertical trust, in the 
first case through political discussion serving as a means of social interaction, and in the second 
through maintaining a so-called implicit contract between citizenry and government (Freitag, 2006; 
Frey,  1997;  Putnam,  1993).
16  Thus,  in  order  to  disentangle  the  allocation  effects  of  direct 
democracy  from  its  trust-generating  influence,  we  extract  population  shares  of  horizontal  and 
vertical trust from the 1998 wave of the International Social Survey  Programme (ISSP, 2001).   14   
Following Uslaner (2005), we assume time invariance of generalized trust; however, unfortunately, 
for vertical trust, only 1998 values are available.
17 
Already Durkheim (1951) argued that a strong credo exerts a suicide lowering influence through 
its social cohesion-enhancing influence. Believing in the existence of a life-granting God may also 
morally  contradict  taking  one’s  own  life.  Recent  empirical  studies  support  this  conjecture, 
suggesting that the influence of religiosity works both through network effects as well as through 
attitudes towards life (Neeleman and Lewis, 1999; Hilton et al., 2002; Helliwell, 2004). In the 
Swiss context, it is the more religious social groups of society that are politically more conservative, 
aiming at maintaining the status quo, which implies fighting the trend to expand the competences of 
the federal  political institutions at  the expense of direct popular  rights  (Fischer and Schneider, 
2008).  In  this  study,  we  measure  religiosity  by  the  share  of  ‘atheists/agnostics’  that  has  been 
constructed  using  the  ISSP  1998,  analogous  to  the  two  trust  variables.  It  is  measured  by  the 
population share of those who answered “I don’t believe in God” or “I don’t know whether there is 
a God and I don’t believe that there is any way to find out” to the question about which statement 
“comes closest to expressing what you believe about God” (ISSP 2001, p. 52). 
18  
Similarly,  suicide  rates  are  hypothesized  to  increase  with  age,  not  only  because  of  a 
disintegration effect but also due to increasing health care costs that lower the expected life time 
utility (Hamermesh and Soss, 1974; Chuang and Huang, 1997, 2007). The age composition of the 
population is taken into account by the proportions of age groups ‘24–44 years’, ‘45–64 years’, and 
that of elderly people (> 64 years) in the cantonal population (all from the BFS). We also include 
the  size  of  a  canton  in  terms  of  population  because  higher  degrees  of  direct  democracy  are 
systematically observed in smaller cantons (see Table 3 correlation coefficient   = -0.68). 
Furthermore,  to  account  for  the  special  cultural  structure  of  Switzerland,  we  include  a 
dichotomous variable which indicates that the main language spoken in a canton is either French or 
Italian. Previous empirical studies by, e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2008) and Dorn et al. (2008), show that 
the dominant language serves as a proxy for a different majority culture, which exerts a differential   15   
influence  on  the  assessment  of  subjective  well-being  and  correlates  with  the  degree  of  direct 
democracy (  (romance language, direct democracy) = -0.83 ).  
Summary statistics and variable definitions are reported in Tables 1 and 10, respectively. The 
raw correlations between direct democracy and the explanatory variables are displayed in Table 3. 
 
 
5 Results  
The regression results for a panel of suicide rates in 26 Swiss states between 1980 and 1998 are 
reported in Tables 4–6, for the total population and subsamples by gender. Table 4 present the 
results for the baseline model, in which the economic variables are excluded. Table 5 includes 
economic  factors  such  as  national  income  and  unemployment  rate,  and  social  factors  such  as 
divorce and fertility rates. Table 6 adds to the baseline model economic factors lagged by one 
period. The adjusted R-squared and a Wald test of joint significance of all explanatory variables are 
displayed in the last two rows of the tables. 
 
5.1 Baseline model 
Total population 
In Table 4 we present OLS estimation results with panel-corrected standard errors for the baseline 
model.  Clearly,  in  column  1,  the  governance  structure  variables  appear  to  be  significant 
determinants of suicide rates in the cantonal population. The negative estimate on direct democracy 
indicates that less suicide occurs in cantons with stronger popular rights (at the 5 percent level). In 
addition, the degree of fiscal decentralization within a canton exerts a suicide-lowering effect on the 
overall suicide rate (at the 1 percent level). These results suggest that more spending responsibilities 
at the local level and stronger political rights lead to a general public good provision closer to local 
people’s  preferences,  thereby  raising  citizens’  well-being.  These  findings  lend  support  to 
Hypotheses 1 and 5. In contrast, the positive coefficient estimate for the local autonomy variable   16   
suggests that policy decentralization makes people unhappier (significant at the 1 percent level). 
Thus, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 4, which predicts that more local autonomy is 
deleterious to people’s well-being caused by, for example, an underprovision of public goods and 
lack of transparency of political competencies. Arguably, in the Swiss context, autonomy at the 
communal level may  well approximate the degree of  social cohesion –  with  stronger cohesion 
implying stricter social norm enforcement. Notably, this finding contradicts the results by Frey and 
Stutzer  (2000)  which  could  not  identify  a  separate  effect  of  local  autonomy  for  average  life 
satisfaction, based on the entire life satisfaction distribution. This difference shows, again, that 
institutional impacts on life satisfaction may well be heterogeneous with respect to the percentile of 
the subjective well-being distribution.   
As regards the remaining explanatory variables, more trust among citizens is associated with 
higher suicide rates. The argument is that any successful suicide could be viewed as an attempted 
suicide with an unfortunate ending. Attempted suicides may signal a ‘cry for help’. The greater the 
number of individual’s social contacts and trust in the potentially benevolent attitude of her peers, 
the  greater  the  probability  of  peers  receiving  and  reacting  to  this  signal  ‘suicide  attempt’.  As 
expected, vertical trust exerts a significant negative impact on suicide rates. Atheism is positively 
correlated with overall suicide rates, which is consistent with empirical evidence from a panel data 
analysis (Neumayer, 2003b). Non-German speaking cantons are significantly associated with lower 
suicide rates, suggesting that cultural differences exist across language borders in terms of suicidal 
behavior (or reporting of mortality causes).
19 Contrary to expectations, there is also a negative link 
between the degree of urbanization and suicidal behavior. Potentially, health care systems are better 
developed in cities compared to the countryside. The foreign population appears to have a lower 
suicide risk. Possibly, Swiss immigration laws might serve as a selection mechanism that ensures 
only financially well-situated persons or those with a work contract are granted residency.
20 In 
addition, the effect of population size on suicide rates appears to be zero. Finally, middle-aged 
persons are at a higher risk compared to other age groups. 
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Results by gender 
The regression results of the baseline model by gender, reported in Table 4, columns 2 and 3, 
confirm the results for the total population. However, all institutions appear to have a more sizeable 
impact on female suicide rates than on male suicide rates, with coefficients of direct democracy and 
fiscal decentralization almost double in size. As regards the control variables, we equally observe 
differential  impacts  by  gender  for  most  of  them,  including  horizontal  and  vertical  trust  in  the 
population, atheism, the dominant language of the canton, the degree of urbanization, and the size 
of the canton. More specifically, a higher level of trust among citizens appears to impact only 
female suicide rates, indicating that attempting suicide as a signal to peers may be an incentive 
particularly for women. Similarly, in both larger and more urbanized cantons, significantly more 
suicide is committed by women than by men (e.g. Qin et al., 2003). In line with previous research, 
these findings support the conjectured differences in the underlying stochastic process describing 
gender specific suicide rates (e.g. Brainerd, 2001). 
 
5.2 Comprehensive model including economic factors  
Existing  studies  provide  evidence  that  direct  democracy  has  a  positive  influence  on  economic 
conditions. For example, estimating an aggregate production function, Feld and Savioz (1997) find 
economic growth and per capita income to be significantly higher in cantons with stronger popular 
rights, while Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner (2008) detect a more equal net income distribution. In 
both  cases,  the  more  favorable  outcomes  are  explained  by  a  higher  degree  of  efficiency  in 
government activities. Analogously, as outlined in our hypothesis section, more local political or 
fiscal autonomy might equally lead to improved economic conditions. 
Because both direct democracy and decentralization may improve well-being through altered 
economic circumstances, disentangling the direct and indirect effects of governance structure may 
better reveal their purely institutional impacts. To test this conjecture, in Table 5 we estimate the 
baseline model augmented with three additional economy-related determinants: national income,   18   
growth of national income, and unemployment rate. If strong indirect institutional effects were 
present, we should observe losses in statistical significance and substantially reduced coefficient 
sizes of our variables of interest compared to the baseline model estimates. Table 5 also tests the 
sensitivity of our results with regards to divorce and fertility rates.
21 
Taken all together, we find no substantially different estimation outcomes for direct democracy, 
fiscal decentralization and local autonomy between the baseline and the extended models – neither 
in  terms  of  statistical  significance  nor  in  terms  of  coefficient  sizes  (Tables  4  and  5).  This 
observation suggests that cantonal wealth, economic growth, and unemployment do not serve as 
transmission channels for these cantonal institutions – at least when it comes to explaining suicide. 
These findings are robust to assuming several model specifications with respect to the economic 
condition measures (columns 1 to 4 in Table 5). The first model assumes that both growth effects of 
GDP  and  unemployment  may  be  conditional  on  their  pre-period  levels,  following  the  macro-
economic growth literature (columns 1 and 2), while the second model investigates present-time 
level  effects  only  (columns  3  and  4).  Among  the  economic  variables,  only  the  (lagged) 
unemployment rate appears to exert a significant influence, while national income is never decisive 
for committing suicide (see also Table 6).
22 Again, we find quantitative, but no qualitative gender 
differences in the institutional impact. 
As  regards  the  social  integration  hypothesis,  the  positive  coefficient  on  the  divorce  rate 
(significant at the 1 percent level) is consistent with our prediction and previous empirical evidence. 
In  contrast,  the  effect  of  fertility  rates  on  suicide  rates  seems  to  be  statistically  insignificant. 
Obviously, in Switzerland, the presence of children does not give rise to social (net) benefits.
23  
 
5.3 Robustness analysis  
We perform several robustness checks to verify whether our results are driven by outliers and or 
significantly  altered  by  using  alternative  controls.  First,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that 
individuals take time to respond to changes in socio-economic conditions (Spijker, 2003; Minoiu   19   
and  Rodriguez,  2008);  for  this  reason,  we  use  the  one-period  lagged  unemployment  rate  and 
national income. Second, we also estimate both models with a dichotomous variable that controls 
for canton Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI), which, even though with its 14,000 inhabitants equaling 
only the size of a small town, shows extraordinarily high average suicide rates that in some years 
surpass 50 per 100,000 inhabitants.
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The results of the robustness tests are reported in Tables 6 and 7, and, as a comparison with 
Tables 4 and 5 shows, lagging the economic determinants or excluding potential outliers does not 
substantially  alter  our  regression  results  with  respect  to  our  variables  of  interest.  The  three 
institutional variables coefficient estimates are robustly statistically significant, again with slightly 
lower magnitudes for males compared to the female population. Overall, the estimations presented 
in Tables 6 and 7  support  our previous  conclusions about  the  importance of institutions  when 
explaining suicide rates.  
 
5.4 The role of government spending 
 
So far we have observed that stronger political rights and greater degrees of decentralization within 
a canton appear to reduce the occurrence of suicide in Swiss cantons. Policy outcomes through 
which  political  institutions  and  governance  structures  affect  citizens’  well-being  and  suicidal 
behavior may be mirrored by the types and amount of public goods produced by governments. Such 
production of public goods is then reflected in corresponding components of government budgets 
such as expenses on education, public safety, and public health system, etc.  
As  shown  in  Feld  and Kirchgässner  (2001),  Schaltegger  (2001),  and  Fischer  (2005),  direct 
democracy  and  fiscal  decentralization  exert  dampening  impacts  on  sub-federal  government 
spending  in  Switzerland.  In  general,  the  effect  is  observable  for  almost  all  types  of  budget 
components, but most prominent for those spending types that relate to policy areas in which the 
Swiss cantons have been granted political autonomy by the Swiss federal constitution. These areas 
include  public  safety  (police  spending),  social  safety  net  (welfare  spending),  public  education   20   
(educational  spending),  health  sector  (public  health  spending),  and  cultural  events  (cultural 
spending).  
In principle, these negative correlations between political institutions and government spending, 
on the one side, and suicide rates, on the other, justify a transmission channel analysis.  
According to the median–voter–hypothesis developed by political economists, we would expect 
that the postulated well-being raising impacts of political institutions and governance structure are 
mediated  through  overall  government  consumption  spending.  That  more  general  government 
effectiveness is conducive to well-being has been shown by Helliwell (2007). In such case, all 
budget components should equally serve as transmission channels of institutional effects on suicide. 
In  contrast,  in  line  with  some  empirical  health  economics  literature,  the  suicide-lowering 
impacts of direct democracy and fiscal decentralization might simply run through the provision of 
health care only. Possibly, in Switzerland more direct democratic and decentralized cantons target 
their health policies more effectively, leading to an earlier detection of ‘persons at risk’. Given that 
the previously observed suicide-lowering effects of governance structure are entirely caused by 
increased efficacy of the health sector, we should observe that only health spending transmits these 
institutional effects, but not any other budget component.  
This section aims at analyzing the potential transmission channels of these institutions’ impacts 
on suicide, trying to discriminate the median–voter–argument from the efficiency–in–health–care–
view.  To  empirically  test  the  claim  that  public  goods  provision  of  Swiss  cantons  serves  as 
transmission channel of the institutional effects for suicidal behavior, we augment our baseline 
model with the according government spending variables (measured per capita) that relate to the 
areas of autonomous cantonal and local political decision-making described above. Transmission 
channel effects should be present when the coefficients of the mediated institutional determinants 
appear largely reduced in size and/or loose their significance at conventional levels – compared to 
the baseline specification that excludes government spending. Notably, higher suicide rates might 
trigger a policy response by the cantonal and local governments, possibly giving rise to endogeneity   21   
with  respect  to  our  measures  of  government  activity.  However,  due  to  a  lack  of  exogenous 
instrumental variables we present OLS results only.  
Nevertheless, the various government spending components may exert suicide-reducing impacts 
of  their  own,  as  previous  empirical  research  suggests.  In  general,  government  consumption 
spending  on,  e.g.,  culture,  security,  and  schooling  may  affect  people’s  perceptions  of  how 
generously the state government values their material and non-material well-being. In particular, 
according to Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner (2008), welfare spending may measure not only the 
extent of factual ‘government generosity’ in terms of redistributive activities in any given canton, 
but also government’s preferences for social fairness, which will affect satisfaction levels, hence 
rates of suicide. As regards health care spending, empirical analyses of suicide for the US suggest 
that the level of effort exerted by the state government is suicide-reducing (Minoiu and Rodríguez, 
2008).  Studies  by  Hill  and  Pebley  (1989)  and  Wimberly  (1990)  show  that  more  government 
spending is associated with lower levels of infant mortality. 
Table 8 presents the OLS estimation results with panel-corrected standard errors and indicates 
what  type  of  government  spending  components  (education,  welfare,  security,  health  care,  or 
culture) may serve as transmission channel for the previously observed institutional impacts.
 The 
estimated coefficients for decentralization and local autonomy and their significance levels appear 
quite unchanged across the equations, suggesting that little of their impact is transmitted through 
sub-federal  government  spending.  In  contrast,  the  estimates  for  direct  democracy  suggest  that 
almost all budget components mediate its influence (Table 8, columns 1 to 6). Its coefficients are 
insignificant and considerably reduced in size – except for the welfare spending regression. With 
correlations among the budget component spending measures ranging between 0.52 and 0.79 (see 
Table 9), we estimate a model in which all spending variables are jointly included. The estimates 
support  our  conclusion  that  the  effect  of  direct  democracy  is  mediated  through  sub-federal 
government budgets. Throughout Table 8, expenditures not only on health, but also on education 
and culture appear significantly associated with suicide rates, and tests of joint significance suggest 
that all other spending components are equally decisive. This finding contradicts the view that only   22   
the provision of public health care mediates institutional effects. However, the positive sign of some 
spending  estimates  may  indicate  a  reverse  causality  problem,  biasing  the  vector  of  estimated 
coefficients.  
Taken all together, our transmission channel analysis in Table 8 suggests that the effects of 
spending decentralization and local political autonomy are not mediated through local and cantonal 
budgets. In  contrast, most of  the  impact of  direct  democracy  is transmitted through almost all 
government spending components. Returning to our two hypotheses presented in the beginning of 
this  section,  we  find  no  evidence  that  the  suicide-lowering  effect  of  direct  legislation  works 
exclusively through an improved or better targeted health care system. Rather, these findings are in 




This paper analyzes the impact of direct democracy, local autonomy, and spending decentralization 
on suicide rates by exploiting variations in the political institutions and governance structure of 26 
Swiss states between 1980 and 1998.  
Our empirical results show that for the total population, stronger popular rights and more fiscal 
decentralization reduce suicide, while more local autonomy increases it. The former two findings 
are perfectly in line with the very scarce empirical literature on the effects of decentralization and 
popular rights on life satisfaction, as reported in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, (2008b), Dorn et 
al. (2007), and Frey and Stutzer (2000). However, the latter result for local political autonomy 
contradicts it.  
Quantitatively, the institutional effects on female suicidal behavior appear larger compared to 
the male one, suggesting a heterogeneous impact of governance structure with respect to gender. 
This result is somewhat in line with suicide studies focusing on government activity, but also with 
life satisfaction snslyses focusing on political discrimination of women (Bjørnskov, Dreher and   23   
Fischer, 2007b; Minoiu and Rodríguez, 2008). This gender-specific difference remains even when a 
possible mediation through changes in economic conditions is taken into account.  
From a classical economics perspective, the beneficial impact of direct democracy may manifest 
in a more efficient or more effective provision of public goods. In consequence, direct democracy 
may lower suicide rates – even if no rational cost-benefit analysis by the suicide victim is assumed 
– mainly working through a better targeted health policy. However, a supplementary investigation 
with sub-federal government spending data suggests that the impact of direct democracy is not 
mediated  through  the  health  sector,  clearly  contradicting  the  ‘efficiency–in–health–sector–
hypothesis’.  In  contrast,  the  models  suggest  that  all  main  activities  of  sub-federal  government 
equally transmit the suicide-lowering effects of direct legislation.  
From a theoretical perspective, it would be appropriate produce separate models of suicide for 
different age groups. It is to say, when studying suicide, specific socio-economic circumstances 
might affect potential suicide victims more during childhood than during adulthood status. A more 
detailed analysis will be necessary to understand gender differences, particularly in an international 
context,  and  formulate  appropriate  policies.  As  we  present  an  ecological  study,  an  important 
implication is that the determinants at the individual level effects might be different from those at 
population level, which constitutes a limitation to our interpretation. Further research is also needed 
employing  alternative  and  differing  measures  of  well-being  that  relate  to  mental  and  physical 
health, as the effect of institutions may well be heterogeneous. 
Since the fall of the communist regimes, the world has welcomed the democratization process in 
Eastern  Europe,  assuming  that  the  whole  population  will  profit  from  these  new  institutions. 
However,  our  suicide  research  for  Swiss  cantons  suggests  that  benefits  from  democracy  and 
decentralized spending systems are not equally distributed across genders. These results imply that 
changes in the political institutions and governance structure in any one country may well affect the 
various population groups in different ways.  
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1 As Oswald (1997) states, suicide data cannot be generated in laboratory experiments. 
2Many  individual  determinants  of  life  satisfaction  may  well  be  subject  to  simultaneity  bias.  For instance,  persons 
showing happiness in the past might be more likely to be married at the present time, more likely to be employed, even 
to live  longer,  and  so  on.  In  contrast,  there  is no  way  suicide  in  the  past  could  affect today’s  sociodemographic 
characteristics (other than they no longer count among the living). 
3 Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1980), distinguish two dimensions of federalism, namely (i) joint assignment of 
functions and (ii) local-level taxing power. 
4 Alternative definitions are based on local revenue or local revenue from own tax sources. 
5 In political science, this concept is also referred to as decision decentralization (e.g., Treisman, 2000b). 
6 See Martínez Vazquez and McNab (2003) for supporting literature on the producer efficiency aspect. Particularly for 
Switzerland, more fiscal decentralization in public education was found to lead more efficient provision of public 
education (Barankay and Lockwood, 2005). 
7 For empirical evidence of the beneficial impact of federalism on GDP growth, see, e.g., Akai and Sakata (2002), 
Thiessen (2003), Freinkman and Yossifov (1999); on income level see, e.g., Lane and Ersson (2000); on investment 
rate, see, e.g., Lancaster and Hicks (2000). Conflicting results have been presented by, e.g., Zhang and Zou (1998), Xie 
et al. (1999), and Woller and Phillips (1998). Inconclusive results are also obtained for the impact of federalism on 
public  sector  size  (Gil  Canaleta  et  al.,  2002;  Cameron,  1978;  Ehdaie,  1994).  For  its  impact  on  regional  income 
disparities and income redistribution, see, e.g., Gil Canaleta et al. (2002); on corruption, see Treisman (2000a), Fisman 
and Gatti (2002); on governance, see Dreher (2006); on human capital accumulation, see Treisman (2000b). 
8 For empirical support of these effects, see, e.g., Matsusaka (2000), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001), Feld, Fischer and 
Kirchgässner  (2008), Feld and Savioz (1997), Fischer (2005), and Frey and Stutzer (2000). 
9  Similarly, Ferriss (2002) reports a happiness increasing impact of personal autonomy in a human relationship context.  
10 An alternative approach is to cluster observations on the state level, accounting for within-group correlation. The 
main findings of this paper are robust to using this alternative estimation method.  
11  This procedure affects 0.35 percent of male suicide rate observations and 3.32 percent of observations in the female 
sample. Zero values were recorded particularly in smaller cantons, especially in Appenzell Innerrhoden (5 obs.), Uri (4 
obs.), Obwalden (3 obs.), Glarus, Jura, and Nidwalden (1 ob. each) for female suicide rates, but only in two cases for 
male suicide rates (Glarus and Nidwalden, 1 ob. each). 
12  In Switzerland, local spending and revenue shares are correlated more than 0.9. 
13  Unemployment might have a direct or indirect suicide rate-increasing effect, the one working through the creation of 
social distress and the other through a reduction of personal income. 
14 Systematic empirical evidence for this claim is missing. However, support for the extreme-right populist party SVP 
appears stronger in cantons in which institutions of direct legislation are better developed: the correlation coefficient 
between the share of seats held by the SVP in the Swiss national parliament, disaggregated to the state level, with our 
measure of direct democracy is about 0.4. 
15 Generalized trust might also work through its beneficial impact on economic performance, educational attainment, 
and  health  (Knack  and  Keefer,  1997; Coleman, 1988; Helliwell,  2007).  For  the  impact  of  social  capital  on  adult 
mortality,  see  Kawachi  et  al.  (1997),  and  vertical  trust  through  a  government’s  fiscal  performance  and  quality 
(Helliwell, 2003, 2004; Schaltegger and Torgler, 2005). 
16 At the aggregate level, confidence in political institutions of a country appears to be correlated with generalized 
(horizontal) trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
17 Trust among citizens is measured as the cantonal share of people who indicate the two highest categories out of four 
to the question of whether they believe that people can, in general, be trusted. The indicator of vertical trust is the 
percentage  of  residents  expressing  “complete  confidence”  or  “a  great  deal  of  confidence”  in  the  Swiss  national 
parliament. 
18 The other possible statements include “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some 
kind”, “I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others”, “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe 
in God”, I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it”. 
19 This result contradicts the cultural differences in self-reported life satisfaction identified by Dorn et al. (2008).                                                                                                                                                                         
20 This statement also applies for EU citizens prior to 2004. 
21 According to Wilkinson (1996), income inequality plays a major role for population health. For a comprehensive recent 
review of the literature in this area, see Deaton (2003) and Lynch et al. (2004). However, we abstained from reporting the 
test for income inequality due to large number of missing values in our GINI coefficient, which is based on biannual 
cantonal aggregated tax records until 1996 only. However, its impact is not significant, which is in support of Leigh and 
Jencks (2007)’s most recent panel data analysis for a set of rich countries. 
22  The  suicide  lowering  influence  of  unemployment  rate  may  be  explained  by  social  norm  effects  which  give  rise  to 
heterogeneous disutility from unemployment (see Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer, 2008). 
23 In Switzerland, the financial burden imposed by child rearing is extraordinarily high in comparison to other developed 
countries in that child benefits are low and costs for childcare cannot be deducted.  
24 The city of Basel, whose extreme fiscal decentralization value results from its city-state status, might be a potential 
outlier; however, its dummy was never significant in the regressions.   27   
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Table 2   
Summary statistics (N = 442) 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Suicide rate (log)  3.06  0.32  1.90  4.12 
Male suicide rate (log)  3.40  0.64  -4.61  4.50 
Female suicide rate (log)  2.26  1.22  -4.61  3.86 
Direct democracy  4.30  1.22  1.50  5.83 
Latin dummy  0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Confidence in parliament  0.24  0.14  0.06  0.74 
Social trust  0.71  0.12  0.50  1.00 
No belief in god  0.16  0.11  0.00  0.48 
Life has no meaning  0.54  0.18  0.00  1.00 
Local autonomy  5.00  0.77  3.20  6.10 
Fiscal decentralization  0.33  0.11  -0.01  0.49 
National income  3.23  0.20  2.87  3.99 
Growth national income  0.01  0.03  -0.07  0.09 
Gini coefficient of inequality  30.12  2.46  24.12  39.49 
Unemployment rates  1.53  1.76  0.00  7.60 
Foreign population  0.15  0.07  0.05  0.38 
Urbanization  0.60  0.24  0.14  1.00 
Female foreign population  0.13  0.06  0.04  0.35 
Male foreign population  0.17  0.07  0.06  0.42 
Population (log)  11.92  1.11  9.45  13.98 
% female of population (log)  11.24  1.13  8.75  13.31 
% male of population (log)  11.21  1.10  8.77  13.26 
% of population 25–44 years  0.30  0.02  0.23  0.35 
% female of population 25–44 
years  0.29  0.02  0.21  0.34 
% male of population 25–44 
years  0.31  0.02  0.24  0.36 
% of population 45–64 years  0.22  0.02  0.19  0.27 
% female of population 45–64 
years  0.22  0.02  0.19  0.27 
% male of population 45–64 
years  0.22  0.02  0.18  0.27 
% population aged 65 and over  0.14  0.02  0.10  0.21 
% female of population aged 65 
and over  0.17  0.03  0.12  0.25 
% male of population aged 65 







Partial correlations of direct democracy (N =442) 
Variable  Direct democracy 
Fiscal decentralization    0.047 
Local autonomy   0.259*** 
Social trust   0.340*** 
Confidence in parliament  -0.574*** 
No belief in God  -0.022 
Latin dummy  -0.826*** 
Foreign population (%)  -0.469*** 
Population (%)  -0.683*** 
% of population 25-44 years   -0.028 
% of population 45-64 years   0.451*** 
% of population > 65 years  -0.326*** 




Table 4   
Baseline model  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Overall  Male  Female 
Direct democracy  -0.056**  -0.044*  -0.091** 
  [2.50]  [1.70]  [2.38] 
Fiscal decentralization   -0.552***  -0.474**  -0.978*** 
  [3.59]  [2.25]  [4.13] 
Local autonomy   0.077***  0.067***  0.082** 
  [4.29]  [3.38]  [2.05] 
Social trust  1.199***  0.657  1.622*** 
  [5.74]  [1.46]  [3.12] 
Confidence in parliament  -1.071***  -1.149***  -2.280*** 
  [6.73]  [5.11]  [4.85] 
No belief in God   1.221***  1.366***  0.921* 
  [5.57]  [4.17]  [1.73] 
Latin dummy  -0.161***  -0.085  -0.360*** 
  [2.78]  [1.32]  [3.37] 
Urbanization  -0.117  0.049  0.695*** 
  [0.98]  [0.24]  [2.88] 
Foreign population  -0.900***  -1.271***  -0.671* 
  [5.17]  [4.74]  [1.74] 
Population  -0.001  0.049  0.088* 
  [0.05]  [0.95]  [1.87] 
Age 25-44 years (%)  2.323*  -0.722  -0.231 
  [1.78]  [0.33]  [0.09] 
Age 45-64 years (%)  2.16  -0.287  -1.317 
  [1.34]  [0.10]  [0.44] 
Age > 65 years (%)  0.769  0.14  -0.776 
  [0.95]  [0.11]  [0.48] 
       
Observations  494  494  494 
Number of groups  26  26  26 
Adjusted R squared  0.987  0.973  0.833 
p-value Wald test    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the suicide rate (per 100,000 population). All 
estimations were carried out using STATA 9.2. A constant term and time fixed effects are included but not 
reported. Observations are weighted by the corresponding square root of the population. Panel-corrected and 




Model with economic factors included, robustness with fertility and divorce rates 
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
Direct democracy  -0.048**  -0.113**  -0.049**  -0.114**  -0.045*  -0.114** 
  [1.99]  [2.15]  [2.09]  [2.46]  [1.75]  [2.12] 
Fiscal decentralization   -0.642**  -1.100***  -0.542**  -1.063***  -0.737***  -1.009*** 
  [2.28]  [4.85]  [2.20]  [5.12]  [2.65]  [4.21] 
Local autonomy  0.080***  0.116*  0.076***  0.114**  0.076***  0.099 
  [4.05]  [1.96]  [4.10]  [2.20]  [4.27]  [1.56] 
Social trust  0.52  1.813***  0.655  1.789***  0.434  1.636** 
  [1.04]  [2.67]  [1.51]  [3.05]  [0.90]  [2.18] 
Confidence in parliament  -1.252***  -2.863***  -1.237***  -2.523***  -1.089***  -3.002*** 
  [4.38]  [4.77]  [4.71]  [4.44]  [3.73]  [4.80] 
No belief in god  1.261***  0.841  1.350***  0.963*  0.894**  0.239 
  [3.30]  [1.59]  [3.95]  [1.89]  [2.18]  [0.29] 
Latin dummy  -0.076  -0.381***  -0.091  -0.416***  -0.088  -0.356** 
  [1.22]  [2.58]  [1.36]  [3.13]  [1.37]  [2.29] 
Urbanization (%)  0.326  1.153***  0.185  0.900***  0.181  1.185*** 
  [1.06]  [3.22]  [0.69]  [2.86]  [0.66]  [3.28] 
Foreign population (%)  -1.159***  -0.685*  -1.126***  -0.527  -1.590***  -1.209* 
  [4.18]  [1.65]  [4.73]  [1.39]  [4.66]  [1.81] 
Population (%)  0.063  0.081  0.051  0.073  0.053  0.076 
  [1.16]  [1.31]  [1.05]  [1.39]  [0.99]  [1.28] 
Age 25-44 years (%)  -1.285  -1.000  -1.077  -0.321  -2.924  2.493 
  [0.57]  [0.34]  [0.51]  [0.12]  [1.31]  [0.62] 
Age 45-64 years (%)  -1.591  -2.505  -0.68  -1.202  -4.326  1.154 
  [0.50]  [0.71]  [0.25]  [0.40]  [1.17]  [0.30] 
Age > 65 years (%)  -0.25  -1.418  0.007  -1.212  -1.188  0.942 
  [0.16]  [0.84]  [0.01]  [0.75]  [0.72]  [0.37] 
National income -Lag  -0.238  -0.301      -0.271  -0.335 
  [1.24]  [1.17]      [1.48]  [1.38] 
GDP growth  -0.139  -0.973      -0.067  -0.82 
  [0.19]  [0.99]      [0.09]  [0.85] 
Unemployment rate- Lag  -0.039*  -0.072***      -0.035*  -0.085*** 
  [1.80]  [2.68]      [1.74]  [3.34] 
Growth of unemployment rate  0.007  -0.042      0.015  -0.039 
  [0.19]  [0.75]      [0.41]  [0.68] 
National Income      -0.149  -0.252     
      [0.84]  [1.13]     
Unemployment rate      -0.025  -0.026     
      [1.21]  [0.93]     
Fertility rate          -8.656  15.331 
          [1.03]  [1.48] 
Divorce rate          0.230***  0.055 
          [3.75]  [0.46] 
Observations  464  464  494  494  464  464 
Number of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26 
Adjusted R squared  0.9696  0.7252  0.9727  0.8156  0.9625  0.7195 
p-value Wald test   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the suicide rate (per 100,000 population). All estimations were 
carried out using STATA 9.2. A constant term and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Observations are weighted 
by the corresponding square root of the population. Panel-corrected and robust Z-statistics in brackets.  
 *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%;.***significant at 1%.  
Table 6 
Regressions with economic determinants lagged by one period 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Overall  Male  Female 
Direct democracy  -0.064***  -0.052**  -0.119** 
  [2.86]  [2.15]  [2.37] 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.636***  -0.632**  -1.153*** 
  [3.75]  [2.34]  [5.23] 
Local autonomy  0.085***  0.083***  0.120** 
  [4.48]  [4.39]  [2.11] 
Social trust  1.191***  0.598  1.831*** 
  [5.11]  [1.29]  [2.88] 
Confidence in parliament  -1.178***  -1.291***  -2.871*** 
  [6.47]  [4.72]  [4.97] 
No belief in god  1.182***       1.302***        0.849* 
  [5.27]  [3.58]  [1.67] 
National income -Lag  -0.081  -0.25  -0.319 
  [0.71]  [1.34]  [1.31] 
Unemployment rate -Lag  -0.021  -0.038*  -0.070*** 
  [1.52]  [1.88]  [2.73] 
Latin dummy  -0.165***  -0.088  -0.391*** 
  [2.64]  [1.36]  [2.79] 
Urbanization (%)  0.047  0.334  1.153*** 
  [0.35]  [1.18]  [3.53] 
Foreign population (%)  -0.911***  -1.155***  -0.731* 
  [5.20]  [4.54]  [1.82] 
Population (%)  0.003  0.059  0.079 
  [0.12]  [1.16]  [1.36] 
Age 25-44 years (%)  1.705  -1.379  -0.95 
  [1.19]  [0.63]  [0.33] 
Age 45-64 years (%)  1.384  -1.436  -2.235 
  [0.82]  [0.49]  [0.69] 
Age > 65 years (%)  0.311  -0.393  -1.581 
  [0.37]  [0.26]  [0.94] 
       
Observations  468  468  468 
Number of groups  26  26  26 
Adjusted R-squared  0.985  0.970  0.756 
p-value Wald test   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the suicide rate (per 100, 000 population).  
A constant term and time fixed effects are included but not reported Observations are weighted by the 
square  root  of  the  corresponding  population.  Panel-corrected  and  robust  Z-statistics  in  brackets.. 




Regressions without outliers 
  AI excluded  BS excluded 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Overall  Male  Female  Overall  Male  Female 
Direct democracy  -0.060***  -0.050**  -0.128***  -0.055**  -0.054**  -0.128** 
  [2.65]  [2.07]  [2.80]  [2.36]  [2.24]  [2.26] 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.600***  -0.560**  -1.226***  -0.631***  0.055  -0.682 
  [3.45]  [2.20]  [6.43]  [2.99]  [0.20]  [1.24] 
Local autonomy  0.082***  0.078***  0.148***  0.077***  0.04  0.101* 
  [4.14]  [3.60]  [2.97]  [3.85]  [1.56]  [1.79] 
Social trust  1.224***  0.65  2.088***  1.141***  0.447  1.705*** 
  [5.44]  [1.39]  [3.74]  [5.00]  [0.94]  [2.73] 
Confidence in parliament  -1.097***  -1.240***  -2.289***  -1.160***  -0.839***  -2.362*** 
  [6.30]  [4.53]  [4.29]  [5.79]  [3.54]  [4.26] 
No belief in god  1.262***  1.376***  1.655***  1.164***  1.687***  1.250* 
  [5.17]  [4.07]  [4.51]  [4.86]  [3.77]  [1.75] 
National income  -0.052  -0.162  -0.364  -0.074  -0.206  -0.334 
  [0.46]  [0.97]  [1.61]  [0.58]  [1.10]  [1.30] 
Unemployment rate  -0.014  -0.027  -0.038  -0.016  -0.034  -0.031 
  [0.94]  [1.31]  [1.38]  [1.04]  [1.52]  [1.03] 
Latin dummy  -0.162**  -0.092  -0.435***  -0.162**  -0.014  -0.405*** 
  [2.52]  [1.34]  [3.36]  [2.46]  [0.16]  [2.79] 
Urbanization (%)  -0.04  0.2  0.990***  0.068  0.012  0.769** 
  [0.29]  [0.75]  [3.03]  [0.45]  [0.06]  [2.04] 
Foreign population (%)  -0.827***  -1.124***  -0.186  -0.821***  -0.943***  -0.276 
  [4.59]  [4.81]  [0.51]  [4.23]  [4.37]  [0.64] 
Population (%)  0.000  0.051  0.057  0.005  0.056  0.067 
  [0.01]  [1.04]  [1.14]  [0.20]  [1.11]  [1.16] 
Age 25-44 years (%)  1.702  -1.088  -2.954  1.850  -1.685  0.228 
  [1.14]  [0.53]  [1.18]  [1.37]  [0.76]  [0.08] 
Age 45-64 years (%)  1.771  -0.843  -1.951  0.497  -0.451  -0.263 
  [1.09]  [0.30]  [0.64]  [0.26]  [0.18]  [0.07] 
Age > 65 years (%)  0.502  -0.095  -2.890*  1.091  -2.830  -2.722 
  [0.55]  [0.07]  [1.92]  [0.86]  [1.20]  [0.94] 
             
Observations  475  475  475  475  475  475 
Number of groups  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Adjusted R-squared  0.985  0.969  0.777  0.987  0.9698  0.831 
p-value Wald test   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the suicide rate (per 100, 000 population).  
A constant term and time fixed effects are included but not reported Observations are weighted by the square root of the 
corresponding  population.  Panel-corrected  and  robust  Z-statistics  in  brackets..  *significant  at  10%,  **significant  at  5%, 
***significant at 1%.  
 
Table 8  
Regression results for baseline model with government spending 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Overall  Overall  Overall  Overall  Overall  Overall  Overall 
Direct democracy  -0.056**  0.005  -0.041*  -0.030  -0.028  -0.024  -0.003 
  [2.50]  [0.19]  [1.66]  [1.26]  [1.08]  [0.91]  [0.12] 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.552***  -0.407**  -0.569***  -0.526***  -0.423***  -0.497***  -0.294* 
  [3.59]  [2.51]  [3.74]  [3.33]  [2.84]  [3.26]  [1.86] 
Local autonomy  0.077***  0.085***  0.079***  0.059***  0.057***  0.055***  0.087*** 
  [4.29]  [4.57]  [4.27]  [3.17]  [2.99]  [2.95]  [4.04] 
Education     0.401***          0.501*** 
    [3.33]          [3.56] 
Welfare       0.059        -0.062 
      [0.94]        [0.95] 
Security         0.112      -0.155 
        [1.30]      [1.41] 
Health           0.179***    0.101 
          [3.02]    [1.50] 
Culture             0.100**  0.05 
            [2.40]  [1.05] 
               
Observations  494  494  494  494  494  494  494 
Number of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26  26 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99  0.9868  0.9873  0.9872  0.9869  0.9875  0.9858 
p-value Wald test   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000 
               
Chi2-test (DirDem, gov. spend.) 













Chi2-test (gov. spending)  
(p-value)             
22.28 
(0.002) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the suicide rate (per 100,000 population). All estimations were 
carried out using STATA 9.2. A constant term and time fixed effects are included but not reported. Observations are weighted 
by the corresponding square root of the population. Panel-corrected and robust Z-statistics in brackets.  




Table 9  
Simple correlations among the government spending components (in log form) 
  Education  Welfare  Health  Culture  Security 
      
Education  1         
Welfare  0.76  1.00       
Health  0.73  0.79  1.00     
Culture  0.68  0.61  0.79  1.00   
Security  0.73  0.69  0.77  0.77  1 




Table 10  
Variable definitions and sources  
Variable  Source 
Total, male and female suicide rates 
Unit of measurement: 100,000 population. Thus, it represents the total number of suicides per 100,000 
population.  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Direct democracy 
Index of  direct democracy.  The index ranges from 1 to  6, and higher values correspond to  more 
democracy. 
Stutzer (1999) 
Latin dummy  
Takes value 1 if the dominating language of canton is either French or Italian   Own calculations 
Local autonomy 
Index of local autonomy in 1992 measured at the local level, aggregated to the cantonal level  Ladner (1994) 
Fiscal decentralization  
Share of local spending in general cantonal spending 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
No belief in God 
Cantonal share responding “I don’t believe in God” or “I don’t know whether there is a God and I 
don’t believe that there is any way to find out” to the question about “which statement comes closest to 
expressing what you believe about God?”  
International Social 
Survey  Programme 
(ISSP), 1998 
 
High confidence in parliament 
Cantonal share responding “complete confidence” or “a great deal  of confidence” to the question 
“How much confidence do you have in the national parliament?” 
International Social 
Survey  Programme 
(ISSP), 1998 
High trust among citizens 
Cantonal share responding “people can almost always be trusted” or “people can usually be trusted” to 
the question “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 




Cantonal share of divorced persons in residential population.  
Unit of measurement: the normalization is 1,000  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Per capita national income   
Log of national income disaggregated to the cantonal level, divided by the cantonal population  Unit of 
measurement: Swiss francs (constant 1980)  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Unemployment rate 
Cantonal share of registered unemployed persons in active residential population. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS 
Income inequality – Gini coefficient 
The unit is the household. Gini coefficient calculated on the basis of official tax records, pretax income 
Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA) 
Growth national income  
Growth rate in national income between t0 and t-1 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Fertility rate 
Number of live births in t / female permanent residential population between 15 and 54 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Foreign population 
Cantonal share of foreign permanent residents in total population, gender adjusted 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Total population  
Log of cantonal permanent population 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Urbanization 
Cantonal share of residents living in cities of 10,000 inhabitants or larger in total population 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
% of population age 25–44  
Cantonal share of residents aged 25 to 44 years in total population, gender adjusted 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
% of population age 45–64 
Cantonal share of residents aged 45 to 64 years in total population, gender adjusted 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
% of population age >65  
Cantonal share of residents 65 years or older in total population, gender adjusted. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Education 
Log of combined local and cantonal expenditures for public education, per capita, deflated to 1980.  
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Welfare 
Log of combined local and cantonal expenditures for welfare transfers, per capita, deflated to 1980. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Security 
Log of combined local and cantonal expenditures for police and security, per capita, deflated to 1980. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Culture 
Log of combined local and cantonal expenditures for cultural events, per capita, deflated to 1980. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) 
Health 
Log of combined local and cantonal expenditures for public health care per capita, deflated to 1980. 
Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS) Learning and Peer Effects
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